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U.S. FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS

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BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

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CONTENTS

	Page
Opening statement of Chairman Roth	1

WITNESS

TUESDAY, MAY 7, 1985

Hon. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations	2

U.S. FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS

TUESDAY, MAY 7, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 9:33 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. William V. Roth, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Roth, Cohen, and Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ROTH

Chairman ROTH. The committee will please be in order.

I want to take this opportunity to welcome Ambassador Kirkpatrick today. We are very pleased and delighted that she could appear before this panel. As everyone knows, she is one of the great intellectuals of our time. She has served with great distinction as our Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

I think it is only fair to say that the United States has been very fortunate down through the years in having many prominent citizens serving in that capacity. But no one has served with greater forcefulness or greater effectiveness than Ambassador Kirkpatrick. We are, indeed, pleased to welcome her here today.

The Ambassador is here today to share some of her experiences in the United Nations. Throughout her tenure in office, she has been an unceasing advocate of active U.S. participation in the United Nations and, as I have already alluded, proved to be an untiring advocate of U.S. political, economic, and moral values in what has often proved to be an unsympathetic atmosphere.

Her activism has, in my opinion, done a great deal to reverse the rising tide of pessimism concerning U.S. participation in the United Nations. Certainly, if the U.S. taxpaying community is expected to routinely contribute 25 percent of the U.N.'s operating budget, it must be convinced that our participation therein is a worthwhile activity.

The overall purpose of today's hearing is to determine the value of U.S. participation in the United Nations and whether the benefits of that participation are sufficient to justify the costs of participation. Obviously, by costs, I do not mean just financial costs, but also diplomatic and personnel costs.

It is expected that in seeking to answer the question, we will deal with a variety of U.S. concerns relating to the United Nations. Has it been effective in promoting peace and security? Is there an anti-

U.S. bias in the General Assembly of the United Nations? To what extent does that harm our interest? Some commentators have pointed out that there have been grave irregularities and abuses in the financial practices and such concerns have led to the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO.

It will be of great value if Ambassador Kirkpatrick can assist us as to how Congress might act to correct any apparent problems relating to our U.N. participation. But our concerns go beyond U.N. political and financial practices. As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I am particularly concerned about allegations that the Soviet Union is using its U.N. presence as a cover for espionage activities in the United States.

Similarly, some very respected commentators have charged that the United Nations, by granting observer status to groups such as the PLO, has served to legitimatize international terrorism. Others have even alleged that U.N. funding has found its way into the coffers of terrorist organizations. These are matters of grave concern to this committee. That concern must now be heightened by the administration's determination to highlight what it perceives to be a potential crisis situation facing the free world in the shape of organized international terrorism.

These clearly are difficult, complex issues. I do not want to take any more of the committee's time, so we can hear Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Before I proceed, I would like to call on Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. No comments, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROTH. Thank you. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, would you please proceed?

TESTIMONY OF JEANE KIRKPATRICK, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Senator Roth. I am, as always, exceedingly pleased to appear before a committee of the Congress to discuss the question of U.S. participation in the United Nations. I believe very deeply in the importance of close and continuing attention by the Congress to the United Nations. After all, through the Congress, the American people contribute $1½ billion or more annually toward the U.N. budget, and they contribute additional moneys to the upkeep and financing of American representatives inside the United Nations.

I say approximately because in my 4 years as U.S. Permanent Representative, I never succeeded in achieving an accurate accounting in which I had any confidence about the total U.S. contribution to the U.N. agencies. The reason for that being, some of our contributions are direct and some are indirect, and some are in kind, while most are in direct dollars and cents, but those indirect and in kind contributions to the various U.N. nations are not trivial. They are important contributions as well. The costs of U.S. representation in the U.N. system are also somewhat elusive, and it is difficult to procure from any agency of the U.S. Government a global estimate of the costs of U.S. representation inside the United Nations.

In any case, the amount is large. It is well over $1 billion annually—closer, I think, to $2 billion annually.

The financial support the United States provides, of course, constitutes a very tangible symbol of our continuing commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and to our commitment to making the United Nations work.

I spoke last week to the United Nations Association, and said there that I believe the United Nations, as it functions today, is not worthy of our unqualified commitment. It is worthy of our best efforts, and our best efforts will require, I think, also close and continuing oversight by the Congress.

There are many aspects of legislation that impinge on U.S. participation in the United Nations. The most direct simply are the appropriations. Those appropriations are of two kinds. The direct contributions to the assessed budget. That is the budget to which we contribute 25 percent. And there are our direct contributions to the voluntary agencies, the independent agencies. We contribute an average of between 20 and 30 percent of the total budget of the independent agencies of the United Nations.

The Congress makes decisions annually about the level of U.S. contributions to each of those agencies.

In addition, of course, the Congress acts to restrict U.S. contributions in various ways through such provisos as the law requiring that no funds be contributed to activities whose primary function is to support the PLO or SWAPO or other so-called national liberation organizations that utilize violence in the pursuit of power.

The Congress participates through other withholding requirements, such as the requirement that in case the State of Israel should be denied participation in U.N. agencies, the United States would withdraw its own participation and contribute no moneys until the participation of Israel had been fully restored.

The Congress participates in U.N. administration through such legislation as the Foreign Missions Act, which governs the conditions of foreign missions' operations in the United States and the foreign diplomatic personnel in the United States.

The Congress, of course, also in a much more broad and basic fashion determines through its continuing decision processes the level of importance the United States should grant to our participation in the United Nations, including such decisions as whether behavior of countries inside U.N. bodies should be taken into account by the Congress in reaching determinations concerning our annual economic assistance appropriations.

I believe it is impossible to overstate the importance of Congress continuing oversight of all these aspects of U.S. participation in the U.N. system. I also believe that the reporting requirements of the Congress, which have been initiated in the last 3 years, including the requirement of reports on voting records in the United Nations, are an important contribution to a strong and effective U.S. presence in the United Nations.

I might just add that it is common knowledge that U.S. influence in the U.N. fell over a period of years to an extremely low ebb. I should like to emphasize that the negative effects of American impotence in the United Nations were not only felt by the United

States but were, I believe, and are felt very broadly by the United Nations and affects negatively U.N. programs in many areas.

I believe, for example, that the tendencies to politicization and bureaucratization that render UNESCO so utterly ineffective in achieving the goals for which it was established are to an important extent a consequence of the impotence of the United States and some other major donors, who adopted an attitude of relative passivity during the period that abuses were accumulating and being institutionalized.

Each of the independent agencies has been threatened in the last decade by these trends to bureaucratization and politicization, and I believe that a vigorous activist American policy, vis-a-vis the United Nations, stimulates broader concern on the part of other nations and, therefore, acts to control the tendencies toward bureaucratization and politicization that threaten the ability of all U.N. agencies to accomplish their tasks.

Some of those tasks are terribly important and some of the agencies have historically been very effective in accomplishing those tasks. As they become politicized and bureaucratized, bogged down in inefficiency, waste and corruption and politics—including local politics—their attention is turned, of course, from important humanitarian and scientific goals such as infant nutrition, mortality rates, disease control, refugee maintenance, international weights and measures, and so forth.

So I think a strong U.S. presence in the United Nations is, above all, important to the United Nations. It is also, of course, important to the American people whose tax moneys fund those activities.

In concluding my opening remarks, I emphasize that in my opinion a number of derelictions have developed which are inconsistent with provisions of the charter. However, these are above all a consequence of the political weakness of the United States and other countries who desire to use the United Nations for the purposes for which it was established.

For example, the practice of excluding a nation without action by the Security Council can only occur with the support of a majority of the nations of the General Assembly. Without that support, it cannot occur. Now, whether there is such a majority in the General Assembly depends directly on the political strength of the nations who desire to have the United Nations run in accordance with the charter.

If nations who want to preserve the charter are strong, then the charter will be preserved and respected. If nations dedicated to the charter are weak, then the provisions of the charter will be simply ignored. Therefore, I believe that there is a direct and basic relationship between the strength of the United States, and the other democracies in the nations who value the principles of the charter, and the ability of the United Nations to survive and thrive.

Thank you, Senator Roth.

Chairman ROTH. Thank you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Let me ask you this: This passivity, this weakness of the democratic nations, if I correctly understand you, is this a product of the charter, the structure of the United Nations, or is it a matter of wanting to get along with those who are representing those countries within the United Nations?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Roth, I think that is an extremely interesting and important question and one on which I have reflected a great deal. I think it originally developed out of the rather utopian expectations of the United States and the other democracies that the United Nations would be a forum—the only forum in the world—in which people would behave in a purely disinterested fashion, on the basis of reason and altruism. There was an expectation the United Nations would not turn into a political arena.

Now, it did develop into a political arena, but our expectations that it would not was matched by our conviction that it should not, and we seem to have largely ignored the fact that this whole set of political institutions was developing. We did not notice that a very hard, rough game of politics is played in the United Nations. That plus, I think, a certain guilt, paternalism on the part of the former colonial powers.

The United Nations, after all, contained only 51 members when it was established. Today there are 159 members. The difference is the so-called new nations, most of whom entered the United Nations from the mid-1960's to the early 1970's and at the same time that large numbers of new nations were entering the United Nations, they were forging new political blocs and their former colonial masters were adopting, I think, a kind of benign and somewhat passive attitude toward the new political structures that were developing.

Whatever the reason, we—the United States, and the other democracies—did permit to develop around us a political system in which we are a permanent minority and the ill effects of that political system are felt today throughout the General Assembly, the Security Council, and a good many of the independent agencies. We almost permitted the bullies to take control of the playground, frankly.

Chairman ROTH. It seems to me in a sense we were a little naive in thinking that the United Nations would not be politicized. Certainly your experience there shows that an individual can make a difference, but I wonder, is there anything we can do in the way of reforming, changing the U.N. structure? I suppose, No. 1, it would be very difficult to bring about any change in the charter, but should that be a goal? In the long term, should we seek any kind of a constitutional convention to make the United Nations more capable, or should we try to deal within the system as we have created it?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Roth, certainly we would do some things differently if we were rewriting the charter of the United Nations today. Had we known then what we know now about the functioning of the United Nations, we would have written the charter differently.

The truth is, however, that the negative programs and effects, outcomes in the United Nations that exist today, came into being and are preserved for political more than formal reasons. The same political forces that produced the negative outcomes would effectively prevent charter reform, and since we do not desire to engage in idle exercises, I think our time is better spent working on the restoration of the political influence of the United States and the

democracies within the United Nations. If we can restore the political influence of the United States and democracies in the United Nations, then constructive programs will be supported, and negative practices will cease or be greatly diminished.

That is, I think, a more realistic approach than the approach of charter reform. Certainly, if we were going to undertake charter reform, we would want to look hard at the allocation of financial contributions and voting power in the United Nations. An extremely difficult situation created by the fact that the countries who pay the bills do not have the votes, and the countries who have the votes do not pay the bills. You can have a majority of the members of the General Assembly who may vote in favor of an increased expenditure and incur no increased costs to themselves. The countries which contribute more than 85 percent of the U.N. budget regularly vote against that budget, but are unable to prevent its increase because the countries who pay less than 10 percent of the U.N. budget have the votes.

Certainly there are many aspects one would want to change if one were going to rewrite the charter, but I do not believe it is realistic to anticipate that this institution with this majority is going to vote the privileges of the majority out of being.

Chairman ROTH. Congress some time ago passed legislation saying that the U.S. Government would not contribute more than 25 percent of the overall U.N. budget. Is there any reason why we, as an institution, should not move further? Does it make much sense to have so little contributed financially by so many and yet have them decide the budget, or is this something that we should examine more carefully here, not only with respect to the United Nations itself, but also its independent agencies?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Well, as I am sure you know, the assessments for the proportion of the share of the U.N. budget to be paid by each nation are based on the gross national income, per capita income of nations on the principle that those who can afford to pay should pay is the absolute cornerstone of the U.N. financial system.

There are some problems with that, however. The biggest problem is the reliability of the statistics on which the assessments are made. Those statistics are provided by member countries to the U.N. Secretariat, and the statistics reporting levels of per capita income or gross national income, GNP, are not uniform. I think that it would be interesting for the Congress to examine some time the statistical bases of these assessments.

It is well known the Soviets and Soviet bloc countries manipulate statistics in ways that are unfamiliar to our accounting practices, to put it mildly.

But I think the principle of payment on some sort of proportional basis to income is probably the only realistic one for the United Nations. The United Nations is most important to the smallest nations, I think, and they could not afford to be members if their dues were substantially increased. They might be, however, persuaded to be somewhat more concerned about the consequences of their decisions. The U.S. mission to the United Nations has worked very hard in conjunction with the State Department on this problem of controlling budget.

Chairman ROTH. Let me change for one moment to another area, and then I will turn it over to Senator Cohen. There has been, as you know, a great deal of concern that the United Nations has been a cover for espionage by the Soviet Union and possibly other Eastern satellite countries, as well as a means of helping finance terrorism. Would you care to comment on those charges?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think the Soviet doctrine of national liberation movements is very firmly grounded in the U.N. practice. The PLO, for example, is a full-fledged observer organization, not only that, they enjoy some benefits that are not available to member states in the United Nations.

The Council on Namibia which regularly represents a SWAPO point of view holds meetings all over the world. These meetings constitute publicity activities on behalf of SWAPO. The Committee on Palistine Refugees has a very large budget and conducts world-wide activities on behalf of the PLO.

The way our legislation is written, we are to withhold financing of any activities whose primary purpose is to benefit the PLO or SWAPO or any other terrorist organization.

I think that that legislation has been interpreted in such a way that "primary" means "exclusive," and so we have not withheld as many funds from those activities as we perhaps should have if we were going to be serious about not supporting organizations which use violence as the preferred instrument in the pursuit of their political objectives.

The espionage problem inside the United States is a very serious one. Would you like to me try to address that?

Chairman ROTH. Yes; I would.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. It is well known by our intelligence agencies and our counterintelligence agencies that the Soviet Union and associated countries have for many years introduced intelligence agents, espionage agents into their missions in the United Nations, and into the U.N. Secretariat where they enjoy diplomatic immunity. The number of those agents are several hundred, and while I am not personally expert on them or their activities, the FBI and some other U.S. Government agencies are. I do know tracking those agents under conditions that they enjoy diplomatic immunity is a major problem to our counterintelligence agencies and to our Government broadly. It is a big job for us to protect ourselves against them.

Chairman ROTH. Does it make any sense to have one set of rules for the Soviet diplomats here in Washington representing the Soviet Union here in Washington and another set of rules in the United Nations? As I understand it, Soviet diplomats here are very limited as to where they can travel and under what circumstances, whereas in contrast, those assigned to the United Nations are free to travel wherever they want. Does this difference of treatment make any sense?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. The difference in treatment arose under an interpretation of U.S. duties under the host country agreement. We signed, of course, a host country agreement and undertook some obligations with regard to the treatment of diplomatic personnel appointed to the United Nations or Secretariat personnel of the United Nations.

Now, the interpretations of those obligations has been an object of considerable ongoing discussion. In the past, our obligations have been very broadly intrepreted under the host country agreement. For a long time, the host country agreement was interpreted as providing blanket immunity and freedom to foreign personnel attached to the United Nations, as though those personnel operated wholly outside the authority of American law enforcement agencies—more so than ordinary diplomatic personnel.

We are speaking of two categories of diplomatic personnel. First, there are diplomatic personnel assigned to the missions of the countries who are represented in the United Nations. Second, there are personnel who work for the U.N. Secretariat.

There have never been any restrictions applied to the personnel who work for the Secretariat, although clearly we know that there are numerous espionage agents, intelligence agents among those personnel.

Chairman ROTH. Did not Congress back in 1947 reserve certain rights involving security of this Nation?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes; Congress passed a Foreign Missions Act which provides important new leverage to the U.S. Government and to the FBI and others whose job it is to protect us against espionage.

The Congress provided authority to the U.S. Government to restrict the travel of personnel whom we have a reasonable grounds to suppose might be engaged in espionage and to enforce adequate reporting of their intended travel to the U.S. Government which would, of course, make it easier for the FBI and others to know the whereabouts of these agents.

Now, the FBI, as I understand it, has welcomed the Foreign Missions Act very warmly, and we are still in the process of trying to decide precisely how that should be implemented. A proposal which I have supported as Permanent Representative would apply the travel restrictions and reporting requirements of the Foreign Missions Act to all personnel who are secunded to the Secretariat. The Foreign Missions Act provides the basis for requiring nationals of certain countries to register their travel with the State Department to provide advance notice and would impose the same travel restrictions as are already done on diplomatic personnel of various missions.

Chairman ROTH. But we have never exercised that requirement.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. So far that has never been done. Senator Roth, the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries have a practice called secunded, which places their nationals employed by the U.N. Secretariat in a special relationship with the U.N. Secretariat. A bureaucratic and administrative arrangement is maintained according to which Soviet personnel or Bulgarian personnel or Hungarian personnel who work for the U.N. Secretariat are not employed directly by that Secretariat. They are secunded to the Secretariat, and they continue in the employment of their own government.

Now, it is said that there are a good many other non-Soviet bloc countries who secund personnel. That is true. We secund personnel from time to time for a very limited purpose and temporary assignment. So do a good many other countries, but only the Soviet bloc

countries secund all their nationals who work for the United Nations and maintain them in that status for as long as they work for the U.N. Secretariat.

Other countries regard their nationals who work for the U.N. Secretariat as international civil servants. The United States does not try to exercise any discipline or authority over Americans who work for the U.N. Secretariat. However, the Soviets and Soviet bloc countries do use the device of secundment to maintain their control over their own nationals who work for the U.N. Secretariat.

Among other things, they use it to protect themselves against defection. If a Soviet national who works for the U.N. Secretariat decides he desires to remain in the United States, let's say, the Soviets will use the fact that he is still formally on their payroll to remove him from his U.N. post, if he decides he no longer desires to serve as a Soviet employee.

Now, we have suggested that the employees who are secunded, foreign nationals who are permanently employed by the U.N. Secretariat and secunded to the Secretariat might be required as a category to register all of their travel to secure permission for long distance travel and for both official and personal travel to book through the Office of Foreign Missions at the State Department. If they are required to book through the Office of Foreign Missions at the State Department, then, obviously, U.S. Government agencies will be well informed about their travel.

I believe this is the most promising device for both accomplishing the purposes of our law enforcement agencies—getting advance notice for travel of those nationals without notifying those nationals about which ones among them are necessarily thought to be espionage agents because our law enforcement agencies do not desire to give such notification, and I think it would be useful. I think it would be a useful strategy.

We also, I might say, have proposed that members of missions to the United Nations continue to have special easily identifiable license plates and to register their automobiles, and that members of certain missions, including the Soviet bloc missions and Libya, be restricted to 25 miles from U.N. headquarters, except with special permission, which special permission can only be obtained through the Office of Foreign Missions. Travel and accommodations beyond the 25-mile limit would have to be booked through the Office of Foreign Missions.

Now, if those provisions were applied to the foreign missions and the comparable restrictions were applied to the Secretariat employees, we would have very greatly eased the problems of American law enforcement agencies trying to keep track of all the spies, quite bluntly, that are found today in and around the United Nations.

Chairman ROTH. I have more questions, but I want to turn it over to Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. How would we implement the proposed restrictions you just talked about?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. They are provided under the Foreign Missions Act, and they can be implemented by the decision of the President, possibly, through the Office of Foreign Missions at the State Department.

Senator COHEN. So all we have to do is call upon President Reagan to listen to your recommendations and say implement them, and they will be put into effect?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. That is right. In fact, the Secretariat has joined in those recommendations. They are also his recommendations. I think most of the U.S. Government agencies involved in dealing with the United Nations have today joined in those recommendations. They are pending now at the NSC. They have not been acted on at the NSC. What we need now is to have them acted upon.

Senator COHEN. How long have they been pending?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Several months. And there was a process, interagency process of discussion of approximately a year that preceded their transmission to the NSC. I, frankly, do not have the precise date they were transmitted to the NSC. I would say at least 3 months.

Senator COHEN. You have in the past, as reported in a 1982 AP story, called the United Nations a "very dangerous place." At that point Ambassador Moynihan, now Senator Moynihan, also wrote a book entitled "A Dangerous Place." I assume that is because many, if not most, of the nations which are gathered at the United Nations mascarade as freedom-loving countries while, in fact, serving as front men and women of totalitarian policies and philosophies. Is that basically why it is dangerous, in your judgment?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator, yes; I think so. I think the United Nations is only a dangerous place to us if we do not protect ourselves effectively. I think we have the instrumentalities needed to protect ourselves effectively in the United Nations. The United Nations is whatever the members make it. As I have often said, our problems are not with the United Nations any more than the problems of the Congress are with the staff, committee staffs, or housekeeping.

Senator COHEN. Do you equate the two, Congress and the United Nations? [Laughter.]

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. The housekeeping staffs of the Congress, but with the Members. It is the Members who make the policies and our problems; when we have problems, they are with the Members. The United Nations is whatever the members make it. It is in a very real sense what we who have a potential for being influential in that body permit it to be by our inactivity or ineffectiveness.

Senator COHEN. We are only, I suppose, as strong as the number of votes that we have. According to your testimony, our votes and those of our Western World allies are generally outweighed by the actions of the rest of the membership. So, as a practical matter, what kind of recommendations would you make, in addition perhaps to the persuasive powers of the purse string, to effect these reforms?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator, I would say most of the countries in the United Nations are not anti-United States or anti-West or antidemocratic. There is no permanent anti- or any United States majority in the United Nations. That, I think, is a widely held misconception; a misconception that is widely held among friends of the United Nations and among adversaries of the United

Nations. It is a misconception, however. There are real adversaries of the United States in the United Nations. There are the Soviet bloc which usually stands for something very different than we. There are the radical Third World nations and the radical Third World nations, usually, although not inevitably, are closely linked to the Soviet Union. Libya would be one example closely linked to the Soviet Union; Iran is one less closely linked.

Then there are the democracies and most of the countries in the United Nations fall in neither of those categories. Most of the countries in the United Nations are small, poor countries struggling for survival, wanting to make their own independence, trying to make ends meet, and they participate in that political struggle, and they get recruited to one side or the other depending on the effectiveness, really, and activity of the various political groups in the United Nations.

Most of the questions that are dealt with in the United Nations are not matters principally of East-West concern, however. Most of the questions dealt with in the United Nations are principally concerned with the Third World; the Third World majority largely dominates the agenda, directs the agenda. Some questions are a matter of deep national concern to us.

What happened in the United Nations, I think, with the Soviets being—and the radical Third World—hostile to the United States and to democracies were active and aggressive and politically effective. The United States, and I regret to say most of our democratic friends, were passive and essentially abdicated serious political struggle for support in the United Nations. Where you had activity and force on the other and inactivity and passivity on the other, you can imagine what happened to most of those countries in between. They went with the—and they still do—they go with the side that the greatest force and pressure is on, and that was the Soviet and radical side.

As we become more active, more often they vote with us.

Senator COHEN. Let me call your attention to the Heritage Foundation study. Assuming no sweeping changes were made, what is your judgment concerning whether or not the United States—No. 1—should continue in the United Nations; or—No. 2, whether the United Nations should continue to exist at all without reform?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think in the current situation, the United States really must continue in the United Nations. The reason is all the countries in the world want us to continue in the United Nations. All the countries in the world, including all of our best friends, all our NATO allies want us to continue in the United Nations; all our Latin friends want us to continue in the United Nations. It would be a terrible shock to the world if we were to withdraw, and we would bear up under that, but I think we would not gain in standing or reputation. It is very well known that the United Nations was a kind of an American offspring, and we took a major role in its founding. I think we should stay in the United Nations, but we should be effective.

We can be effective in the United Nations if we devote ourselves to this and if there is cooperation between the Congress and the State Department, there can be effective U.S. participation in the United Nations.

Now, with regard to should the United Nations continue to exist at all, I think the fact is the United Nations does exist. Like death and taxes, the United Nations is with us, and it is our job to survive in that world.

Senator COHEN. I was going to call your attention to the study or paper done by the Heritage Foundation. This study comes to the conclusion that in the absence of certain reforms, which I will read in a moment, the world would not be any worse off if the United Nations were dissolved. I take it from your statement you disagree with that conclusion?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I disagree with it? I have to think a long time in a lot of detail to answer that question. Certainly, there are a lot of U.N. agencies which do very important work, humanitarian work and scientific work. A good many of those, by the way, work quite effectively and are of greater use to us in the industrial world than to others. The International Telecommunications Union would be a good example; WIPO; Weights and Measures; UNICEF—these are brainchildren of the West. Most of these, however, antedated the United Nations. They existed before the United Nations, like the World Health Organization; they might very well continue.

I have no doubt that we very badly need most of those organizations and literally if they did not exist, we would have to reinvent them. We might reinvent them a little differently. If we go to the United Nations, the political core of the United Nations, the Security Council, I would have to think a long time before I can answer the question whether the world would be worse off without them.

Senator COHEN. Let me read the statement, and then I will talk about the reforms. The author, who is vice president of the Heritage Foundation, said:

> If these reforms are not accepted by the United Nations or if the reforms fail, then the United States and other democratic nations should consider withdrawing from the United Nations and should this ultimately prompt the dissolution of the United Nations——

As the essay suggests—

> The world would be no worse off. Indeed, nations would be able to use this opportunity of a world without the United Nations to fashion a new system of international cooperation.

That is the conclusion they reach. I would like to read some of the proposals they would recommend, many of which I think we might all agree with.

One would be—and you touched upon this at least briefly, I think, in your last comment—that the U.N.'s technical agencies must once again deal exclusively with technical matters. Pointing to Israeli settlements, human rights violations in Chile—or indeed, the Soviet Union—and promotion of the new international economic order should not be on the agenda of the World Health Organization, the International Telecommunications Union, or the International Labor Organization.

No. 2, that the United Nations must stop funding the PLO, SWAPO, and other such terrorist organizations. You have indicated that we have an accounting problem or that there is a difficulty with the language which we have used. Perhaps we could delete

the word "primary" and just say: "No funds shall go directly or indirectly to the funding" of these organizations.

Three—something I would like your comment on—that the General Assembly stature must be reduced. The proposal would be to reduce the significance and status of our diplomatic delegation to the General Assembly, perhaps attending it only periodically to show that we suffer it but do not participate in it.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think that is just exactly wrong, with all due respect to my friends at the Heritage Foundation who have done some good and valuable work on the United Nations and who I often worked with in their research and analysis. The United States, in my opinion, needs to be stronger in the United Nations, not weaker. We need to be more active in the General Assembly, not less active and more effectively active.

Our problem is not with participation; it is with effectiveness. What we need to do is to direct our efforts toward being more effective. Now, that recommendation is based on the assumption, but we cannot be. We write it off because we cannot be effective. If we do that, then we cannot even limit the damage to us, and our friends, and our values. To limit the damage to us, to our friends, and values, we must be an active effective presence in the United Nations.

I am myself absolutely persuaded that there are only two reasonable courses for the United States to consider with regard to U.N. participation. One is active, effective, political participation, and I underscore political. This is a political body. We have got to bring the same principles of politics to it that we bring to our own political life.

The other alternative would be, in fact, simply to remove ourselves from that body, and I think that is not the appropriate alternative today, but it is a possibility for us, as it was with regard to UNESCO, but reduced visibility or reduced activity, reduced presence, I think, is a real mistake. That is the wrong way to go. It puts us deeper in the hole.

Senator COHEN. Our best interests are not served by trying to diminish the significance of the General Assembly. We lose more effectiveness in doing so.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. We would not diminish the effectiveness of the General Assembly that way. It would be just as ineffective as it is, just as noisy, but we would be less effective.

Senator COHEN. I am happy to hear your testimony because from time to time we hear calls—particularly from the conservative side of the philosophical spectrum—saying, let's get out of the United Nations, or let them move it to the Soviet Union, or Geneva, or Vienna, or some other place. I think you would agree that does not necessarily make the world a safer place for us to exist in splendid isolation. In fact, we do have to maintain that long twilight struggle. I would like to know what your impression is about the kind of action the administration took in giving 1 years' notice and pulling out of UNESCO.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I wholly supported that action.

Senator COHEN. What, in your judgment, have been the consequences? Should it be applied, for example, to agencies such as the World Health Organization, the ILO, or some of the others whose

activities do not correspond to what we think they ought to be doing?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Let me just say, I begin by saying the United States did withdraw from the ILO a number of years ago under the urgings of the AFL-CIO and under similar circumstances at a point when the ILO was doing almost exactly the opposite of what it had been founded to do; namely, creating barriers to free trade unions in the world. UNESCO arrived at that condition of creating barriers, for example, to the free flow of information in the world rather than helping to remove obstacles for the free flow of information, which is one of its tasks. It had become so bureaucratically overblown and top heavy that, as I am sure you know, 85 percent of the total budget was spent in the headquarters and on the headquarters, which is a fantastic fact, datum.

The politicization of UNESCO was as dramatic as its bureaucratization. I think the politicization had gone so far in UNESCO that not only was it serving anti-West, antidemocratic, anti-United States, anti-Israel purposes, but it effectively, it paralyzed its own self-corrective mechanisms. All of the self-corrective mechanisms in the organization were neutralized by the power of the politicization and bureaucratization of the agency.

I felt, therefore, that after having tried for 3 years giving it our very best try to return UNESCO to its constructive purposes for which it was founded, it was appropriate for the United States to say, no, we will not continue to finance this operation; that there is a limit to the perversion of an institution that will still be financed by the United States, because it was not just a question of whether we remained in it, but whether we remained a principal financer of its activities.

I thought that was the right decision. I do not think that that decision should be applied to any other U.N. agency at this time. I was not part of an administration plan to create a domino effect in U.N. agencies, as some people suggested. That is simply not true any more than the ILO decision of the United States a number of years ago was such a decision; no. It was a decision reached on the basis of close examination of the operation of UNESCO, sincere persistent effort toward the amelioration of the improvement of that operation, failure and a sober conclusion that we could not in conscience continue to spend taxpayer money in that fashion.

Senator COHEN. A final point on contributions. As I recall, the United States used to contribute 40 percent of the U.N. budget. We are now down to about 25 percent. Even with 25, the Soviet Union contributes about 10 percent, and my understanding is, if we are talking about basing it on respective abilities to pay, Saudi Arabia pays roughly 1 percent. Is that roughly correct in your judgment?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I do not know the Saudi percent, actually.

Senator COHEN. It is very small.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I do not think we were ever as high as 40. We were once over 30. Was it 40?

Senator COHEN. I think it was 40.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. All right. The Soviets today pay, I think, 13 percent. I remember the precise figure. I believe it is 13. The assessments are reevaluated, reassessed from time to time.

The politics of the United Nations affects that assessment of assessments, too. Again, I would only say the answer to this problem, as to virtually all the problems is vigilance and political effectiveness.

If we can become effective, as we become effective, then our chance of getting a fair shake in assessments dramatically increases.

Senator COHEN. How do we stay effective when people like you decide you've suffered enough burnout and would like to leave?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator, 4 years is a long time to devote to the U.S. representation in the United Nations. I was very honored and enormously challenged and deeply gratified, in fact, by my experience in the United Nations, and greatly honored to represent the United States in the United Nations. I also had some personal problems which made it very important for me to return to Washington. I felt that one term was, given my personal difficulties——

Senator COHEN [interposing]. Was enough?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Enough. I took my turn.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Chairman ROTH. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I think you make a very important fundamental point, one which we seldom see in the press, or in statements in the Congress; namely, that many of our difficulties within the United Nations, in a sense, are of our own making.

In other words, despite the organizational and structural problems in the United Nations, our own passivity, our failure to aggressively develop majorities for our position has been a problem; is that a fair statement?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. That is a fair and accurate statement, Senator.

Chairman ROTH. It seems to me that is an extremely important point that needs to be brought home very clearly, not only to our lawmakers but, to be perfectly candid, to our State Department. Why this lethargy, this failure to attempt to develop a new majority, if you want to call it that?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I do not know. I know some things. I know in the early days of U.S. representation in the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, and Adlai Stevenson—by the way, I now have the third greatest longevity of any U.S. Permanent U.N. Representative in the United Nations. Lodge was 8 years and Stevenson 5 years. They were very vigorous in their representation of the United States in the United Nations. Exceedingly vigorous.

There developed then a kind of habit of less active U.S. role and democracies in the United Nations alongside all the new nations; 1964 is kind of a watershed year. Sixty new nations entered the United Nations in that one year, and the nonaligned movement was developed that year. The party system developed.

Meanwhile, in our own Government, there seemed to take root the notion that the United Nations was a place for the Third World to let off steam. I called this the "Turkish bath" theory of the United Nations. We should not really take very seriously what happens there; all that is going on is a bunch of nations letting off steam.

That is frivolous, really. We should take very seriously what goes on there because what goes on there has very important effects in the international economics, in security matters, in space matters, in health matters, and above all, in international politics.

I think we are not well organized to represent U.S. interests in the United Nations, in my opinion. And most U.S. Permanent Representatives have served relatively short terms. Arthur Goldberg served for more than 3 years. He, I guess, now has the fourth greatest longevity. The average tenure of a U.S. Permanent Representative before I arrived in New York was 18 months. That included the 8 years of Henry Cabot Lodge and 5 years of Adlai Stevenson. The average tenure of U.S. Representatives after Stevenson in 1973 was only about 11 months.

Since the United Nations operates a lot like the Congress in terms of the politics, it is a lot like the politics of a legislative body, you know in 11 months, you hardly find your way around to hearing rooms, and freshmen Senators do not enter and become maximally effective in their first 12 months in the job.

We were turning over U.S. Permanent Representatives so rapidly that they could not possibly become very effective, but you may ask yourself why? I think the reason was the ineffectiveness and malorganization of the operation left our representatives wanting to leave, and the fact that they left contributed then to the ineffectiveness and malorganization, a kind of vicious cycle came into being which was characterized by a lot of, I think, disorder and irresponsibility in decision making.

Very often we have had a situation in which persons in the State Department, in the Bureau of International Organizations, for example, have attempted to make decisions about tactics for the U.S. representatives in Geneva, in New York, in Vienna, without ever having been there. You know, it is a little—again, if you think of a Senator trying to operate on the basis of instructions all the way sent from home, not only about what he should do, not only about his goals and policy objectives, about whom he should talk to, what he should say, with whom alliances should be made, I think you can quickly see it would, one, be demoralizing for the representative and, two, ineffective—just ineffective. That happened.

Chairman ROTH. Are there any structural changes or reforms within our own system you would recommend? I know, at least as I understand it, you, for example, I believe it was very important to bring to Congress how an individual member of the General Assembly votes; you have also taken a very strong position with respect to aid. Is there some way we could have better coordination? Is that something that should be legislated or something done within the executive branch?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Roth, I have thought the first requisite of greater U.S. effectiveness was to treat our relations with nations in the United Nations as part and parcel with our relations with those nations outside the United Nations. So that our relations with nations in multilateral arenas should be integrated into relations in bilateral arenas.

We had created a situation in which we regarded the way nations behaved toward U.S. interests in the United Nations as sort of not counting. So that if a nation, for example, regularly opposed

U.S. interests and U.S. values in the United Nations, it simply never was taken into account in any other aspect of our relations with that nation.

I always remember the nonaligned communique in the first year I arrived at the United Nations. It is a shocking document. It was 1981, and it was adopted by the nonaligned caucus, and in the name of the whole nonaligned movement. Very few nations entered any sort of reservation or exception to the report.

That nonaligned communique attacked the United States for every crime in the dictionary of international politics, again and again and again by name. In a year that the Soviet Union had 120,000 occupation troops leveling the villages in Afghanistan, there was never a mention of the Soviet Union; never a mention of any international problem except those caused by the United States and Israel, in fact, or maybe two or three other good friends of ours.

I was so shocked by that nonaligned communique that I wrote a letter to some 65 nations who are regularly considered friendly with the United States who are members of the nonaligned caucus and had joined in that communique saying how can you do this to us; I thought we were friends; we wouldn't say things like this about you; if this is what you think about us, why don't you come and talk to us about it?

My letter produced a very great shock. It was the first time an effort had been made to suggest that treatment of U.S. interests and values in the United Nations was relevant in any way to our relations with a country outside the United Nations, but a number of the nonaligned countries who are good friends of the United States came and said things like, we never knew you cared; we never knew the United States even read such documents, or cared about them, or cared about what we said in speeches here, therefore, we made speeches here and joined in nonaligned communiques to help us out with our relations with the OAS, let's say, or the OAU, or the Islamic Conference or some other basis.

I think that the most important single goal is the integration of U.S. relations with nations in multilateral arenas without bilateral relations. That has to be done by encouraging the State Department to take account of U.S. relations with a nation in the United Nations when they think about the rest of our relations with that nation. That has to mean, for example, that the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretaries and the desk officers will take an interest in how nations behave toward U.S. vital interests in the U.N. bodies.

We have made a lot of progress on that—a lot of progress. I believe more progress is required, and I think perhaps the most important instrument of it is the voting report, and the decisions of the Congress—now, the Congress must also take an account of the behavior of nations toward U.S. vital interests in U.N. bodies. I do not mean, by the way, that any of us should ever expect that other countries are going to tow some kind of American line or vote the way we vote on most issues, but on issues of great concern to us and not much concern to them, we have a reason to suppose that nations who are our friends will take our interests into account.

Chairman ROTH. Is any effort made anywhere in the Government to collate the actions of particular countries? Would the country desk, for example, follow closely what a nation does in the United Nations as well as other spheres, or is no such effort made? Would such an effort be desirable?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Something like that would be very desirable, in my opinion, Senator Roth. The organization of the U.S. representation in the United Nations has discouraged, I think, just that kind of integrated concern.

Many years ago, there was a Murphy report, an organization of the State Department, that actually recommended the abolition of the Bureau of International Organizations on grounds that it constituted a layer of insulation between Desk Officers responsible for U.S. relations with a country and their U.N. behavior. I do not recommend the abolition of the Bureau of International Organizations. I think we have to have some point where there is greater, some kind of coordination between our U.N. representation and the State Department and the rest of our foreign affairs, and I think the Bureau of International Organizations is the appropriate place for that, but I do believe we need to self-consciously eliminate any layer of insulation between U.N. behavior or other international organization behavior and the desk officers, and the desk officers are the mainstream of our foreign policy and I think should continually take into account the totality of a nation's behavior toward us.

If that were to happen, that would be the largest single contribution, in my opinion, to restore U.S. effectiveness in the United Nations.

Senator COHEN. What is the structural relationship between our representative in the United Nations and the State Department?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Ambiguous. I used to say the role of the U.S. Permanent Representative was so ambiguous, nobody was even quite sure where it was.

Senator COHEN. Surely you have a list of nations that continuously vote against the U.S. position. I assume that list is forwarded to the State Department. One of the problems we have is that every time a State Department authorization bill comes to the floor, we get messages of anguish and outrage from the State Department—there goes Congress; there they go again putting their fat hands in the niceties of diplomacy. So we get caught between the two.

On the one hand, we should not be intervening or interfering, and on the other, it is the only control we have in terms of the power of the purse string. So what are we to do?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator, I would like to answer in three parts. First by saying Congress not only has a legitimate role and an important role, but a vital role in foreign policy. I believed this before I spent 4 years plus in Government, and I believe it even more strongly today.

In popular government, the popularly elected officials cannot disdain a role in a domain that is not only financially vital to us but a matter really of life and death and freedom for us: Foreign affairs is such an area. Of course, Congress has a role.

Second, the Congress, of course, has now provided a reporting requirement as an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Congress provided that the President should submit to the Congress annually a report on the voting practices of every nation in the United Nations with regard to matters of U.S. interests and concern. It follows the language of the human rights reporting requirement—where there is a consistent pattern of opposition to U.S. values and interests, the President should take that into account in making recommendations on economic assistance, especially any persistent record of opposition to U.S. interests and concerns. That voting record reporting requirement is on the books. The report was made last year, and for 1984—the 1983 report was made in February 1984, and I provided the preliminary report for the 1984 session before I left office. I do not know whether that final report is in yet. I do not think it is. Someone in the Congress should make an inquiry about that. But the requirement is now a matter of law, and it provides that the President should take into account that voting record in making recommendations to the Congress. It provides the information to the Congress for the Congress to take into account that record.

I think that is a very important instrumentality for greater accountability with regard to U.N. behavior. That is sometimes called arm twisting. I do not think it is arm twisting. I think it is an instrument for accountability.

Finally, I think that the representation of the U.S. Government toward any given country is very complicated, and the Congress and the administration simply must insist that those persons who are principally responsible for our representation with regard to a particular country take into account all aspects of that representation. They should not be permitted to shrug off important domains that affect U.S. reputation and standing in the world.

Senator COHEN. Could I ask one other question, not entirely related, now that we have you here. I read a lot of editorials in various papers about the futility, fatuity, and similar descriptions of economic sanctions against nations. Can you give us your assessment of either the effectiveness, the symbolism, or the diplomatic consequences of economic sanctions?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. It is hotly debated. When the British went to war against Argentina, they invoked comprehensive economic sanctions and asked all their friends and allies to do likewise, and the European Economic Community and the United States did so. Obviously, at that point, the European Economic Community found those economic sanctions to be promising.

When the United States had proposed after the crackdown on Poland to invoke economic sanctions, there was a good deal of resistance in this country and outside it, but today, even those opponents of the sanctions such as, for example, the New York Times, acknowledged in print 6 months ago that the economic sanctions had, in fact, had the desired impact—they had the desired impact on the Polish Government's behavior and probably contributed to the last relaxation of Polish Government sanctions against the Polish people.

With regard to Nicaragua, I think that we see, again, countries who would rather have us adopt no sanctions of any kind, not only opposing economic sanctions but suggesting they are futile.

Economic sanctions are obviously a gross instrument of foreign policy, and they do not achieve their effects in any precise fashion. One might say they are shotgun, or a blunderbuss, not a rifle, but in fact, they are not a rifle or a shotgun either. They are not arms; they are not war; and they are not an instrumentality of war.

I think if we are to reserve force as a final resort in American foreign policy, then we must be prepared to use other kinds of power in difficult situations, and God knows our relationship with Nicaragua is today a difficult situation.

I believe economic sanctions are, therefore, a reasonable measure for our Government to have taken at this time, and I would support them, understanding that they are a clumsy instrumentality of foreign policy.

Chairman ROTH. I would like to go back to some direct questions on the United Nations. We talked a great deal about the General Assembly, while we have not mentioned the Security Council. This may be a comment on that body's effectiveness. Do you see the Security Council becoming a vital force again? Does that depend on détente, possibly, between the United States and the Soviet Union? Should it be enlarged? For example, it has been suggested that regions ought to have some representative on the Security Council, or is this just a temporary situation that should not concern us?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Roth, I think the regions do have some representation on the Security Council. An informal practice has developed that each region, that members will be chosen to reflect roughly the regional composition of the United Nations; that is to say, the regional composition of the world. That already exists.

I do not believe that any of the ills of the Security Council could be improved by increasing its size. Increased size would, I think, cause it to resemble more closely the General Assembly. What is not useful is to have the Security Council resemble the General Assembly. The Security Council should function like a judicial body.

Now, it does not because nations in the Security Council continue to represent not only the political interests of their country, but also of their region and of their political alliances.

The Security Council has become a body in which political interests are as thoroughly represented as in the General Assembly, even the nonaligned caucus is present in the Security Council, for example, and the regions are present in the Security Council, but it is a bit more realistic because it provides through the veto some recognition of the fact that major powers must have a possibility of preserving their vital interests against temporary majorities in the Security Council.

Now, it is true the Security Council is not a very effective instrument of peacemaking or peacekeeping, conflict resolution. The reasons for that relate to the politics of the contemporary world more than they relate to any structural aspect of the Security Council, in my opinion.

Chairman ROTH. Let me go back to your earlier comment that part of the problem has been U.S. passivity in the United Nations.

One of the charges being made against the United Nations is that the majority of the members, being poor countries, are heavily committed to redistribution of wealth, indeed the U.N. voting majority appears to be of that school. Can we effectively persuade them that that is not correct?

For example, the proposed—I have not carefully studied it—the proposed treaty on the Law of the Seas Treaty, in the judgment of many was motivated by the desire to redistribute the wealth taken from the seas. I gather we also have a Moon treaty that would do somewhat the same.

Can we effectively fight this trend in the General Assembly, while promoting concepts favoring a more market-oriented economy?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think so, Senator Roth. I think, again, the answer is an active, articulate, mobilized case for alternative development strategies. The new International Economic Order came to dominate the debate and discussion in U.N. economic agencies in the late 1970's and early 1980's largely, in my opinion, because it was not being effectively contested by anybody. It is an example of the United States, I think, and the free-market countries essentially abdicating active participation in ongoing discussion.

Since the record is so clear on economic development, since it so clearly demonstrates that market strategies of development work and redistribution of strategies do not work, once the case is made, if it is made in all of the appropriate agencies in debates and discussions, it begins to have some real impact.

I think there is today in the United Nations a real difference in the content of discussion of economic issues as compared to 5 years ago, and it is because the United States and other market-oriented countries have taken an articulate role in this discussion.

It is a perfect example of how we can make a difference by our active participation in U.N. politics.

Chairman ROTH. On the question of the success of market-oriented economies, has any effort been made to study the success of Japan and the nations of the Pacific rim, where smaller underdeveloped countries have made such remarkable progress in building up strong economies? Has that been a matter of interest to the United Nations as a test model or case study for progress in other regions of the world?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Not to my knowledge. It has certainly been the objective of close study and scrutiny by the OECD and a number of OECD studies and IMF studies, and so forth. I think that the United Nations itself has not focused directly on that, to my knowledge. However, the fact of that success has been more and more taken into account in the discussions and debates.

Chairman ROTH. Along the same line—anytime, Senator Glenn, you have any questions, please let me know. The question of state control of the media and press has come before the General Assembly. Can we effectively fight that trend within the General Assembly? Can you see progress being made to avoid some of the pitfalls of the "new information order?"

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes; I do, Senator Roth. Again, I think the United States and some of the other democracies have been

fully mobilized in opposition to the spread of state-controlled media and while we have not won—you do not win; but we have certainly made real progress and the progress of state-controlled strategies has been stopped.

Today there is really no new progress toward the establishment of so-called new world information and communication order which looked toward state-controlled media in all countries, but I would reiterate, active, articulate, mobilized political action by the United States, the other democracies, the other independent nations is what is required. That is the key, I think, to preventing the rise of controlled press.

Chairman ROTH. What about the treatment of Israel? Hasn't it been the target of some very strong measures by voting blocks working against the only real democracy in the Middle East? Again, do you think we can effectively get a better understanding and appreciation of why Israel has even been accused of racism, whatever you want to call it, and why resolutions to that effect have been attached to some of the U.N. resolutions in recent years?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Israel is made the scapegoat in the United Nations. It is regularly made a scapegoat for all the problems in the Middle East and sometimes all the problems in the world. Israel does not get fairplay in the United Nations.

I believe that Israel would have been expelled or denied participation in U.N. bodies already, had it not been for the strong action of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Congress and those of us in New York, making very clear that there were limits to our willingness to tolerate the mistreatment of Israel. That process of exclusion was very far advanced.

By the way, this is the 10th anniversary of the obnoxious resolution, Zionism is racism, which Senator Moynihan called the most obscene resolution ever passed in the United Nations. That is still an appropriate description. That anniversary coincides with the 40th anniversary of the United Nations. I believe, again, the United States, unified with the Congress, the President, Secretary of State, the U.S. Mission, active, mobilized, can, in the long run, secure a better shake for Israel in the United Nations.

If we relax, Israel will not only be expelled but be victimized by U.N. policy. There is a direct cause-and-effect relationship here.

Chairman ROTH. Again, it seems to me much of that depends upon having a true activist in the position of Permanent Representative and that is not always easy to find. Does it also come down to a question of organization? For example, there has been much debate since you left that position as to whether or not the Permanent Representative should be a member of the National Security Council as well as the Cabinet. Would it be worthwhile, in your judgment, for Congress to write into the law that the Ambassador to the United Nations should have those positions, or is that more appropriate to be determined by the administration? How would you handle that?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I have said, Senator Roth, that I found it extremely valuable to have sat in the National Security Council and its groups because it was in those bodies that I heard the discussion at the highest level of the goals and directions of U.S. foreign policy, and it was from those discussions that I formed accu-

rate views about the President's and Secretary of State's, Secretary of Defense's needs and goals. That is important, because in the United Nations, we deal with all the subjects in the world, literally. We deal with all the countries in the world. Very frequently, the U.S. Permanent Representative is confronted with a question that will never have been considered in the same form by the State Department, let's say.

You may be at a lunch or at dinner and you have to respond. You may be suddenly confronted with a procedural move that leads you to a vote in an unanticipated fashion in an agency of the United Nations, and you have to respond. If you have a clear and disciplined conception of where the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense are headed, then you have radar to guide you in those moments where you must act without any kind of specific guidance.

A great deal of effectiveness of the U.S. Permanent Representative depends on having such radar. I, therefore, think for our representation in the United Nations, it is useful for the U.S. Permanent Representative to be as well and as accurately informed as possible about directions and orientations. The kind of information that comes not just from reading documents—though reading of documents is terribly important—but from hearing the discussion that surrounds the decision.

In this administration, of course, the President relies on a Cabinet Council form of organization for work of the Cabinet. Therefore, Cabinet membership per se does not entitle one to participation in the substantive decision discussions. It is Cabinet Council membership that really gives one an opportunity to participate in that discussion or even to listen to that discussion.

The National Security Council is the Cabinet Council for foreign affairs in this administration. Therefore, to be a member of the Cabinet but not a member of the National Security Council is not much help, frankly, to the U.S. Permanent Representative. I think it is very useful for the Permanent Representative to be a member of the National Security Council. I also think it is useful for the President to hear input from the Permanent Representative because if you sit in the United Nations, you look at the world through a different window. It is a different window on the world than the State Department, which is principally concerned with bilateral negotiations.

I think frequently that different window on the world gives a slightly different perception which raises a different question. It is useful for the President to hear. The Congress, of course, mandated only the membership Secretaries of State and Defense and the President and the Vice President and the National Security Adviser; beyond that, that has been left for the President for successive administration to decide.

Normally, however, Presidents have included the Permanent Representative. I would like to mention one more advantage to the United States that I see in having the Permanent Representative be a member of the Cabinet and National Security Council. It is that heads of state and foreign ministers and economic ministers of most of the nations of the world travel to New York much more regularly than they travel to Washington for formal visits. They

come to New York for the General Assembly; they come to New York when their country has an issue of concern before the United Nations. If our representative is a Cabinet member, they see our representatives there talk to them, they listen to them.

It is a good opportunity for the United States to cultivate relations, gather information and influence other nations in addition to the opportunities regularly available at the top levels in Washington. And if the Permanent Representative is a disciplined person acting in tandem with our foreign policy, then that should reinforce our position and not conflict.

Chairman ROTH. We do, of course, run the danger of creating divided governments. As you well know, there has been much concern in the past over accusations that the national security adviser has become virtually an independent Secretary of State or at least a serious rival to the Secretary. There was some commentary in the press when you were in the United Nations, that you were becoming the third leg of the foreign policy triad, if you want to call it that. Does that concern you at all?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Some yes, but it concerns me less than the alternatives. When we think about the fact that the United States is today forced to function in a truly interdependent world, to be involved with 159 or 160, whatever, 62 or 63 other nations, then our involvement with them is terribly important to us economically, politically, militarily; that our very fate is often at stake in those relationships.

Senator GLENN. We are on a vote, Ambassador. Mr. Chairman, I will run and vote and we can spell each other.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. It is a big interdependent world. Foreign relations are vital to this country today, and they are complicated in ways that were never foreseen by the Founding Fathers, frankly.

The President has multiple advisers in the domestic policy. Today we are involved with other countries in ways that are almost as vital and complex. It is a good thing for the President to hear advice and comment and questions from more than one foreign policy adviser.

You know, some people argue that orderly administration would have required that the President have only one principal foreign policy adviser. That would be the Secretary of State. But I would say two things. Orderly administration is not as important as effective policy and effective representation of U.S. interests, and no one person, be they the most gifted person in the world, can possibly today represent the United States, make policy for the United States, advise the President of the United States for all dimensions of our relations with all nations in the world with regard to commercial policy and fiscal policy and security policy and intelligence and alliances and so forth and so forth. No one person can do that.

So it seems to me it is appropriate for the President to select himself persons of some stature and qualifications to serve as adviser in the foreign policy field. Just as he has a Secretary of Defense and a Chief of the Joint Chiefs, so can he have a national security adviser, U.S. Permanent Representative in addition to a Secretary of State.

The alternative is that the Secretary of State will be the only one to report directly to the President. That is really what is at stake here. I think it is a good thing for the President to hear comments and questions from different perspectives and that it is reasonable that the President require discipline and decorum from all his representatives. If they behave in a disciplined fashion, then the U.S. Government will speak with one voice.

In fact, there never was in my 4 years at the United Nations a time when the U.S. policy as represented in the United Nations was not that articulated also by the Secretary of State and the President. I think that is demonstration enough that it is possible to do that.

Chairman ROTH. It is almost impossible, anyway, to prevent that. The Secretary of Treasury obviously has real responsibilities in international economics. I have a lot of sympathy for what you are saying in that area.

I would like to go back, if I might, to some of the questions we dealt with earlier. Does the U.N. decision to grant official observer status to groups such as the PLO, serve to legitimatize terrorism? In the past, Congress has required the Executive to withhold U.S. contributions that might conceivably find their way to the PLO. The administration has sometimes done that on its own. Do you think selective withholding is a useful tool, and what is the proper role for Congress in this area?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think, by the way, there is a misstatement in the preface to that question. The law does not require us to withhold funds that might conceivably go to the PLO. It requires us to withhold funds whose primary purpose was to benefit the PLO.

I mention that only because that formulation has been important in restricting the amount of withholding for such funds. I think that it is appropriate for the United States to withhold funds from the United Nations' assessed budget for two reasons:

First, articulated by Justice Goldberg when he was U.S. Permanent Representative, the Sol Goldberg reservation, states that as long as other nations withhold a portion of their assessed budget and suffer no ill consequences—as is provided for in the charter—the United States reserves the right to do likewise on matters of importance to us.

Second, I think that it is appropriate for us to withhold contributions from the United Nations when the purposes for which they are being spent are not consistent with the goals of the charter. Those assessed funds are, after all, assessed in relationship to some specific goals, and those goals are stated in the charter, and if programs are proposed that are themselves inconsistent with the charter and with American values, I think it is appropriate for the United States under those circumstances to withhold.

Chairman ROTH. I see the five lights are on. I would like to recess for 5 minutes until Senator Glenn comes back. I have some more questions, if you are willing to stay a little longer, and I know Senator Glenn has some as well.

The committee is in recess.

[Brief recess.]

Senator GLENN [presiding]. Our hearing will once again be in order, and I apologize for the truncated nature of our hearings this morning, Madam Ambassador. This is the nature of things too often on Capitol Hill, as you are well aware. I am also sorry I could not be here for the beginning of your testimony this morning. I was in an Armed Services Committee hearing. I do have a couple things to ask you.

When I left to go vote, you were talking about some of the decisionmaking processes we have. That is one thing the committee does oversee; that is, the organization of government. I, frankly, am mystified and have been for many, many years, not just during this administration, but going back ever since I have been in the Senate, as a matter of fact, as to just exactly how decisions are made at the United Nations.

Do you consult? Do you have different gradations of levels of importance of things that come up? You check some with the Secretary of State; some with NSC; some with the President? I, frankly, do not think the American people understand the process at all. If they do, I wish they would explain it to me. I know I do not understand it. Can you comment on that? You were commenting about the NSC and the Cabinet Council, how they interrelate, whether you should be a part of them as head of the U.N. delegation. Maybe you can run through that for me a little bit before I get more specific.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. The answer to how decisions are made and what is the process of checking, is as diverse in wondrous ways. The normal way the positions taken by the U.S. mission of the United Nations are arrived at through the normal processes and interagency consultation in Washington and are transmitted from the State Department to the U.S. mission of the United Nations.

That would be true for 90 percent of all positions taken by the U.S. mission at the United Nations. There are certain categories of decisions which are not, because they cannot be dealt with in quite that fashion, and I will give you a couple of examples of those other categories.

One is when the U.S. mission at the United Nations is confronted with an issue that may not have been resolved through normal interagency processes in the U.S. Government. There were during the last General Assembly discussions in the first committee where all the security, armament, disarmament issues are discussed. Some instances of paragraphs in a resolution in which there was no combined authoritative interagency position on it. In that case, the U.S. mission tries to secure quick action by an interagency group in Washington. Usually that works. Occasionally it does not. We may be confronted with taking a position on such a paragraph in New York before the normal interagency process can be convened or before it will be.

Senator GLENN. Just the time required?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Time. Time and formulation. Our time and the formulation with which we confront issues is often different with the way the U.S. Government confronts it. Occasionally, it becomes necessary for the U.S. mission to serve a kind of coordinated function calling first the Defense Department and the State De-

partment and the NSC all in the effort to make certain that everyone is on board on the position the U.S. mission should take when that vote comes up at 2 o'clock that afternoon or 5 o'clock that afternoon.

Occasionally, those issues are of sufficient sensitivity that the U.S. Permanent Representative may get on the telephone and talk to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense or National Security Adviser simply to be certain that there is no misunderstanding and that we are fully clear.

There is another category of issue which is similar but not identical, issues which may be very politically sensitive, or international politics sensitive relevant to some ongoing U.S. initiative in foreign affairs, but which we will have to take a position in New York before U.S. policy is fully unfolded. This happened with Lebanon, for example, and in the U.S. role and the formation of the multinational force for Lebanon, our efforts to get U.N. troops broader jurisdiction in Lebanon, at the same time we are trying to form the NMF. In a situation like that, the U.S. Permanent Representative speaks directly to the Secretary of State or the NSC Adviser or the—whomever. More often than not, it is the Secretary of State. That is not frequent, but it is very important that that option exists for the times that it is needed.

Senator GLENN. Do you contact the President directly very often?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. No. No; I spoke to the President directly about U.N. votes maybe half a dozen times in 4 years.

Senator GLENN. Do you think the organization, as such, who the Ambassador to the United Nations reports to or through this mechanism you are talking about here, should that be locked in by law organizationally or is this something that should be left up to the option of any President, any incumbent——

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK [interposing]. Senator Glenn, may I correct myself? I gave a misleading response to the question of consulting the President. I consulted the President regularly about the broad directions of U.S. policy in the United Nations. My answer was in relationship to specific votes.

Senator GLENN. And I would presume that would vary quite a bit from one President to another, depending on how that person wishes to be involved on specific matters or on the importance of specific issues at any given time. Do you think those relationships should be locked into law regardless of whomever is in the White House or should this be left more flexible?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. As a political scientist, I would say most democracies find it useful to leave the Chief of State free to make those decisions himself.

Senator GLENN. But I would counter that only by saying I think that works fine in a parliamentary system in which the party is fully responsible for what is happening on top. I think with our balance of power system, that is a different ball game. That does not necessarily change my proposal to solve the problem, but do you think we should lock this in with more of an organization locked in by law or leave it flexible?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I don't know. I have not really thought about that question. I would like to give a serious answer to that. I would like to think about that and give you an answer in

writing, if I may, Senator Glenn. May I mention two things that occur to me?

One, that it would be very unfortunate to lock in by law a reporting or organizational chart which left the U.S. Permanent Representative reporting to and through the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations which has been the State Department's preferred organizational chart. I think that would be a deadly mistake. It would be a deadly mistake for just because it is so important for the Permanent Representative to have a personal sense of how U.S. foreign policy objectives relate to all of the—literally all the subjects in the world with which we deal in the U.N. arena.

The United Nations is not like another embassy. There is a myth in the State Department that the U.S. mission to the United Nations is just—we treat it just like another embassy. That is simply not so. The United Nations is not like any other place in the world, and our mission there is not like any other mission in the world.

So I think it would be a terrible mistake to lock in legislatively any such requirement concerning the U.S. Representatives reporting to or through the Assistant Secretary for IO. It is very important the U.S. Permanent Representative, whomever they are, whatever party, whatever circumstance, have the opportunity to consult when necessary at higher levels of our Government.

I became persuaded, Senator Glenn, early in my tenure there that the famous snafu's in which the U.S. Permanent Representative in the United Nations said one thing while U.S. policy said another, as, for example, happened with my predecessor, Ambassador McHenry and President Carter, the relationship with the famous West Bank vote, were not due to undiscipline on the part of the U.S. Permanent Representative, but to ambiguity in the U.S. position and the difficulty of extracting from our Government sometimes an authoritative position on an issue in time to cast your vote in a public arena in the United Nations. To do that on some occasions it is vitally important for the U.S. Representative to reach the top level of Government.

Senator GLENN. I do not want to take up all our time this morning on this, but I would be interested in any comments you have on organization; how you feel this should be locked in; whoever and whomever may be in the particular Presidency or Ambassador to the United Nations; if there are advantages to that one way or the other. You have had experience and should be able to give us advice. I think that could be submitted to the committee, and I would appreciate it if you would send it to me directly.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I will be happy to.

Senator GLENN. It is something that has concerned me for a long time. From one Presidency to another, it is handled in a different way, depending on whether it is State or Defense who is dominating NSC. It seems to be a big floating crap game almost from one Presidency to another. I would appreciate your comments on that.

You mentioned before I got here this morning, I believe, according to what staff told me here, that it is difficult to get statistics so we even know what dues to pay at the United Nations. Could you comment more on that? What do we pay at the United Nations? Do we pay a third?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. No; we pay a fourth of the assessed budget. What I said was it is very difficult to get statistics on the total U.S. contribution to the United Nations because some of that contribution is indirect. Now, the dues we actually pay are a direct contribution in money, but in addition to that, we also have indirect contributions, and we make some contributions in kind, and it is difficult to get a global comprehensive figure on U.S. contributions to the U.N. agencies for those reasons.

Senator GLENN. You made a comment also about the PLO, SWAPO and withholding funds for support of these organizations. Do they get direct U.N. support?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes.

Senator GLENN. In what amount? A sizable amount?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I am sorry, Senator. Excuse me. I misspoke. They get indirect U.N. support. Through activities like the Committee on Palestinian Rights, which fund a great many activities which are of support to the PLO but not the direct beneficiaries.

Senator GLENN. Do any funds go directly to Yasser Arafat for his activities?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. They do not go directly from U.N. coffers into his budget. They pass through some committee of the United Nations and some program. They are just as available as if they were simply transferred by bank draft.

Senator GLENN. And SWAPO, same thing?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes.

Senator GLENN. How would we go about making certain the funds are withheld to the PLO?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. We cannot, of course, prevent the distribution of U.N. funds to the PLO, but we can prevent U.S. contributions to those. I think we can tighten our legislative requirement, frankly. There is a legislative requirement that U.S. funds be withheld from any activities whose primary purpose is the benefit of the PLO. I think that legislative requirement restriction could be written more tightly so that the net is a bit finer, and we would protect ourselves against contributions in that way.

Senator GLENN. The administration cannot take action with the legislation we have right now, the law we have?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Some people think we cannot. That is under the current way that language is drawn.

Senator GLENN. I would think that is one we ought to look into. I do not think we want our funding going to such organizations. If there is any way to cut those off, I think we ought to do it, Mr. Chairman. I would hope we can look into that. If you have suggestions on that, Madam Ambassador, you might see what is needed on that and give the committee some advice. I would appreciate that also.

Espionage at the United Nations; I believe you mentioned that. Should we restrict all the U.N. delegations to a certain distance out of New York, or can we?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I would not think so. It would not be practical. We have always, however, restricted the diplomatic personnel attached to missions of some countries, including Soviet bloc

countries, Libya, and so forth, to a 25-mile radius. We have never restricted U.N. Secretariat employees.

The biggest question now before us is whether we include U.N. Secretariat employees, at least certain of them, under those restrictions provided by the Foreign Missions Act. I believe that that is both desirable and possible.

My opinion, by the way, is based entirely on all the briefings I have had from U.S. law enforcement agencies, like the FBI, charged with trying to protect us against espionage.

Senator GLENN. You suggest also that we should be more active in the U.N. General Assembly or get out. We do not want to get out. We want to be more active. What goes into the term "more active"?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I said more active and effective. Effective is very important.

Senator GLENN. How do we be more active and effective?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think we do that by careful preparation for U.N. politics. The United Nations functions a lot like the Congress—a lot like the Congress. The General Assembly functions especially like a big legislative body. It is a much rougher game of politics than any democratic legislature today.

Senator GLENN. I might quarrel on that with you.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Votes are sometimes bought and sold and intimidation used in relation to U.N. votes. Most countries make clear to everyone that on matters of vital concern to them, they expect their friends will stand with them. It is important that the United States make that clear to our friends, too. Not that we expect anyone to tow the American line, but that on matters of vital interest to us, and of concern, little concern to someone else, that our friends stand with us.

Senator GLENN. Do you have examples where you observed votes bought and sold with intimidation used on certain votes?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes, Senator. There was a Security Council vote concerning Chad after Libya had invaded Chad. The Chadian Foreign Minister came to the U.N. Security Council seeking help. Under the charter, he should have been able to count on that help.

The Libyan Government was very active, particularly against African members of the Security Council. One of those was Togo. Togo had a marvelous habit of voting on the merits of cases in the U.N. Security Council, and the Libyans sent the representatives to Lome to try to intimidate the Togans and threatened them about how much better it would be to go along with Libya's interests and those who did not, and in New York make some very heavy-handed verbal arguments, but on the day of the vote, Togo voted nobly in support of help for Chad, and that night in New York, the office of the Togo Mission was broken into.

Senator GLENN. That same evening?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. That same evening, and the offices of the Permanent Representative were ransacked. His papers strewn all over the place, and it was communicated that—the message was the Libyans could reach Togo even there in New York.

Senator GLENN. Was that break-in ever solved by the police?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. No.

Senator GLENN. That is a pretty good example. [Laughter.]

I am going to have to run and vote shortly; that is the reason Senator Roth just arrived and went back immediately. You indicated that you feel we could use our U.N. votes in helping determine foreign aid. In other words, play hard ball with these people, as they are used to playing with each other, as you just mentioned here.

Do you think that is practical for a country that holds itself up as the paragon of moral virtue, and ethical standards in the world to play that kind of hard ball. Is it in keeping with how we want to be viewed internationally, or is that just being practical in the realm of international politics?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Glenn, I think we confront one of the most basic problems in all of international politics, whether we are willing to use power in support of our values, so to speak. Assuming we in the United Nations will stand for policies consistent with our Constitution, with democratic values and the values of the U.N. charter, if we do that, then it seems to me that in an arena where other nations are continually using power and influence outside the United Nations to influence votes inside the United Nations, it becomes almost a dereliction for us not to do likewise.

Now, obviously, we have to do that with intelligence and civilization, and intelligence means we do not ever confuse the totality of the U.S. relationship with a country with their U.N. votes. That is only one dimension of our relations with a country, obviously, and we have other dimensions—security dimensions, economic dimensions, so forth, but we should make clear that their treatment of vital U.S. interests and basic values in the U.N. "count," so to speak, in our relationship.

Senator GLENN. I do not think we want to insist on a rubberstamp operation. Backing up to what you say, I can say back in our State of Ohio, whenever I have gotten into a discussion about the United Nations, what I hear is "all we do is help these people all over the world with foreign aid and all they do is vote against us in the United Nations." I hear that all the time. People want to be friendly. Americans want to do good, want to help folks all over the world. That has been our history. We did not try to encompass it; we tried to help the people rebuild. People expect if we are being that friendly, helping people upgrade their living standards, and so on, that there should be some more tendency for them to agree with American policy that wants to extend that kind of help around the world instead of just biting the hand, I guess, or something like that.

I am going to have to go vote, too. We are down to five lights. I am sorry to have to put this in recess again. What is your time table?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I regret, I am scheduled to take a plane.

Senator GLENN. Can committee staff advise me, do we have another witness? I am sorry the chairman is not here, but in his absence, I will adjourn the committee subject to call of the chairman. Madam Ambassador, we are very appreciative of your being here today. If you could get that information to the committee you men-

tioned earlier, I would appreciate it very much. I think it can be quite valuable in our deliberations here.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

The committee will adjourn.

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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